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Contingent Lives: The Economic Insecurity
of Contingent Workers
Mary E. O'Connell*
In the paper he contributes to this symposium,1 Dr. Richard Belous once
again provides his readers with some of the best data available on the state
of the contingent work force.2 While dismissing the media projection that
one worker in two will soon be a contingent employee,3 Dr. Belous cautions
that the numbers are large.4 At least one m four employed Americans - and
perhaps closer to one m three - is already a member of the contingent work
force.5 And while the period of most dramatic growth may have passed, the
ranks of contingent workers are expected to increase, if more slowly, m the
years to come.6
Dr. Belous also outlines the benefits and the costs of contingent
employment.7 Weighing both, he concludes that contingent employment is
a valuable response to international competition and is here to stay I The
challenge, Dr. Belous suggests, is not to eradicate contingent employment,
but to redress its deficiencies, especially its impact on workers' access to
* Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. B.A., 1970, Brandeis
University; J.D., 1975, Northeastern University School of Law. Thanks to my colleagues,
Wendy E. Parmet and Lucy Williams, who reviewed an earlier draft of this comment.
Thanks also to librarian Kim Dulin for procuring even the most obscure sources, to Theodore
Sharp and Catherine Cragg for excellent research assistance, and to my secretary, Evelyn
Wiley, who makes me look far more organized than I really am. Thanks also to the organ-
izers of and participants in this very stimulating symposium.
1. Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Work Force: The Key Challenges and
Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv 863 (1995).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 864.
4. Id. at 867-68.
5. Id. at 868 tbl. 2.
6. Id. at 868.
7 Id. at 873-75.
8. Id. at 876.
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social welfare benefits. 9 On this point I agree completely with Dr. Belous;
indeed, I would state the case more pointedly Contingent work radically
alters the basic structures of employment and, in doing so, reveals what has
long been mvisible: That in America, access to crucial social benefits is
linked not simply to the work force, but to assumptions about work that
contingent employment defies.
L The Contraction of Work-Based Benefits
A. Health Insurance
During the last decade, the work-based portion of our social welfare
system has contracted severely 1 By 1993 (the latest year for which data are
available), the number of Americans without health insurance of any kind,
public or private, had reached forty-one million." This represents 18% of
the nonelderly population,' 2 and it reflects an ever widening gap. As
recently as 1989, the number of uninsured Americans was below thirty-five
million, or 16% of the nonelderly population. '
3
Obviously, not every uninsured American is a contingent worker, but
there are data - including some that Dr. Belous cites' 4 - that strongly sug-
gest that contingent work plays an important role in creating and maintaining
9 Id.
10. Like Dr. Belous, I define the term "social welfare system" broadly to encompass
work-based contractual benefits, such as private pensions, health insurance, disability
insurance, and life insurance; work-based statutory benefits, like workers' compensation,
Social Security Old Age, Survivors' and Disability Insurance (OASDI), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-
433 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and Unemployment Insurance (Ul), 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); and non-work-based benefits, such as Medicare, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-
1395ccc (1988 & Supp. V 1993), Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1988 & Supp. V
1993), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d (1988 & Supp. V
1993), and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1988
& Supp. V 1993). Obviously, the non-work-based portion of the social welfare system is
contracting severely as well. See Mickey Kaus, The G.O.P 's Welfare Squeeze, N.Y TIMEs,
Apr. 6, 1995, at A31 (describing attempts at welfare reform); Christopher Georges, GOP
Senators Want $25 Billion More To Be Slashed from Welfare Programs, WALL ST. J., July
13, 1995, at A4 (same).
11. ]MPLOYEE BENEFrr REsEARCH INSTITUTE, SPECIAL REPORT SR-28 AND ISSUE BRIEF
NUMBER 158, SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED:
ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 1994 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 4 (1995) [hereinafter EBRI
REPORT 1995].
12. Id. Because 95.5 % of the elderly are covered by the public Medicare program,
they are excluded from most calculations of the uninsured population. Id.
13. Id. at5tbl. 1.
14. Belous, supra note 1, at 875 tbl. 6.
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the health coverage gap. A recent study by the Employee Benefit Research
Institute (EBRI) describes the uninsured population in terms characteristic
of contingent workers.5 The study notes that many of the uninsured are
"not consistently employed by the same employer."1 6 They "may have a
weaker (or temporary) attachment to the work force, and have less dis-
posable income to allocate to the purchase of health insurance. "7 According
to the report, firms that do not provide health insurance "employ many part-
time workers and experience rapid turnover. ""
The study also documents the shrinking portion of the population with
private, employer-provided health coverage. In 1988, 66.8% of Americans
under age sxty-five had employer-provided health coverage. 9 By 1993, that
number had fallen to 60.8% o
An earlier EBRI study focused on workers who failed to participate in
their employers' health plans.2' Not surprisingly, some of these workers
were covered by a spouse's or parent's plan.' Others could not afford the
employee contribution required for coverage.23 But fully 36% - mostly
part-time, contract, or temporary workers - did not participate in their
employer's plan because they were ineligible.24
Finally, an uninsured worker has no coverage to offer her or his
dependents. Although these dependents may not be contingent workers
themselves, their plight is directly linked to that of the contingent employee.
Perhaps the most depressing statistic in EBRI's report is this: The fastest
growing segment of the uninsured population is children. In 1992, America
boasted 10.2 million uninsured children.' By 1993, the number was 11.1
million.'
15. See EBRI REPORT 1995, supra note 11, at 9-19 (describing the uninsured).
16. Id. at 14.
17 Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 14.
19. Id. at7tbl. 2.
20. Id.
21. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE., SPECIAL REPORT SR-24 AND ISSUE
BRIEF NUMBER 152, EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS: ANALYSIS OF THE APRIL 1993
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 2 (1994) [hereinafter EBRI REPORT 1994].
22. Id. at 13.
23. Id.
24. Id. Over 66% of the ineligible workers were part-time, contract, or temporary
workers. Id.
25. EBRI REPORT 1995, supra note 11, at 18.
26. Id. The vast majority of these children had a working parent. Only 1.5 million
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B. Pension Coverage
Unfortunately, health insurance is not the only incredible shrinking
benefit. In a 1992 Wall Street Journal article on declining pension coverage,
Dr. Belous predicted that by 1993 only 40% of American workers would be
covered by private pensions, down from a peak of 50% m 1980.27 In fact,
as I suspect Dr. Belous would agree, the pension picture has grown more
complex in the ensuing three years. Defined-benefit plans, once the staple
of the industry, have continued to decline precipitously 28 In remarks to a
Senate subcommittee last December, Secretary of Labor Robert Reich noted
that twenty years ago nine out of every ten workers with pension coverage
participated in a defined-benefit plan.29 By 1994, only 60% of pension
participants were in defined-benefit plans.30 However, the rapid growth of
defined-contribution plans, particularly section 401(k) plans, 3' has partially
offset this decline.
Defined-contribution plans are attractive to employers for several
reasons. The one most frequently cited is that defined-contribution plans are
cheaper for employers to administer.32 Less loudly trumpeted, but clearly
advantageous to employers, is the fact that defined-contribution plans shift
the risk that pension investments will perform poorly from the employer to
the employee.33 Although a defined-benefit plan guarantees a certain income
uninsured children had no working parent in the family Indeed, over half were the children
of full-time, year-round workers. Id.
27 Cathy Trost, Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1992, at Al.
28. Employers terminated a stunning 42,000 defined-benefit plans in a two year period
from 1989 to 1991. The American Academy of Actuaries calls this phenomenon "startling."
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, PRELIMINARY REPORT: RESULTS OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES SURVEY OF DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN TERMINATIONS 1 (1992)
[hereinafter ACTUARIES].
29 Reich Says Decline in Savings Rate May Hurt Retirement Living Standards, 21
Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2312, 2312 (Dec. 12, 1994).
30. Id.
31. I.R.C. § 401(k) (West 1994).
32. Anne Willette, Few Workers Know Risks of 401(k) Plans, USA TODAY, Feb. 20,
1995, at IA, 2A (noting lower cost to employers of savings plans). Willette cites the human
resources firm Hay/Huggins' estimate that managing a 401(k) costs less than 75% of the
cost of managing a defined-benefit plan. Id., see also ACTUARIES, supra note 28, at
10 (stating that cost of defined-benefit plans has become much more important concern to
employers).
33. See Camilla E. Watson, Machiavelli and the Politics of Welfare, National Health,
and Old Age: A Comparative Perspective of the Policies of the United States and Canada,
1993 UTAH L. REV 1337, 1381 (noting that employee assumes investment risk in defined-
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at retirement,' 4 a defined-contribution plan does not.35 Finally, many of the
employers who terminate defined-benefit plans either do not replace them at
all, leaving their workers with no pension,36 or replace them with less
generous plans - nearly always defined-contribution plans.3'
The continuing turbulence in the pension area makes it difficult to
generalize about American workers' pensions. Owing largely to the pop-
ularity of 401(k)'s, overall pension coverage seems to be up slightly, from
42% of workers m 1988 to 43% m l993, 3s contrary to Dr. Belous's earlier
prediction. 39  But the American Academy of Actuaries' survey data may
suggest that although coverage is up, the amount invested in pensions is
down. 40
For at least some contingent workers, however, the pension picture is
much clearer - and bleak. The Pension and Welfare Benefits Admmistra-
tion of the Department of Labor recently reported that pension plans cover
only 15 % of part-time workers.4 ' Other estimates are lower.42
contribution plan).
34. See ROBERT L. CLARK & ANN A. MCDERMED, THE CHOICE OF PENSION PLANS IN
A CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 31 (1990) (outlining risks associated with defined-
benefit plans).
35. See id. at 13-16 (delineating risks associated with defined-contribution plans).
36. The American Academy of Actuaries study indicated that 34% of defined-benefit
plan terminations result in workers losing all pension coverage. ACTUARIES, supra note 28,
at 14.
37 "In nearly half of the cases where the employer provided some pension coverage
after terminating the defined-benefit plan, the benefits of the follow-on plan or plans was
rated to be less generous than the benefits provided by the defined-benefit plan that had been
terminated." Id. at 16.
38. Labor Department to Propose Changes after Completing Disclosure Rule Review,
21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1258, 1259 (June 27, 1994).
39 Trost, supra note 27, at Al.
40. This would be true if more generous defined-benefit plans were replaced by less
generous defined-contribution plans. See ACTUAmES, supra note 28, at 16 (noting 90%
probability that post-termination plan will be defined-contribution plan).
41. Pension Coverage for Women Increases, Section 401 (k) Plans on Rise, Survey
Shows, 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1053, 1054 (May 30, 1994).
42. See Future Pension Ihcome Less Certain for Today's Workers, Conference Told, 21
Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2313, 2313 (Dec. 12, 1994) [hereinafter Future Pension Income]
(noting remarks of Olena Berg, Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Pension and Welfare
Benefits Administration, at conference marking twentieth anniversary of ERISA, that
coverage of part-time workers is virtually nonexistent). A Labor Department report dated
January 27, 1994, put the number of part-timers with pension coverage at slightly more than
one-tenth. Majority of Employees in Small Firms Offered Health Plan in 1992, BLS Finds,
21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 291, 292 (Jan. 31, 1994).
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C. Unemployment Insurance
Lack of pension and health coverage are the gaps m social welfare
benefits most often cited m connection with contingent work; indeed, they
are the two Dr. Belous notes in his paper.43 In fact, however, the scenario
is worse. Moving from the contractual to the statutory side of work-based
welfare benefits reveals substantial erosion in the protections ostensibly
offered by the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. 44 Although UI covers
more than 97% of American workers,45 the proportion of applicants deemed
eligible for benefits is in free-fall. A 1993 General Accounting Office
(GAO) report put the recipiency rate at only 39% 46 In other words, more
than six of every ten unemployed workers who have applied for UI benefits
since 1990 have been denied. This is substantially worse than the experience
during the recessions of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when the proportion
of unemployed workers receiving UI was typically about 50%,' a rate that
is itself low by international standards.48
The GAO study describes a complex web of factors that have com-
bined to produce these low recipiency levels, perhaps the most important
being the deteriorating financial status of the state U trust funds, the
source of UI benefits.49 During the 1980s, these funds were battered by
43. Belous, supra note 1, at 875 tbl. 6, 877 tbl. 7
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The federal unemployment
compensation system was created by Titles I and IX of the Social Security Act of 1935,
Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
45. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-93-107, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: PROGRAM'S
ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED 2 (1993) [hereinafter GAO].
46. Id.
47 Id. at 3.
48. During that tune, recipiency rates were about 60% in Germany, Japan, and Sweden.
See FORD FOUNDATION PROJECT ON SOCIAL WELFARE & THE AMERICAN FUTURE, THE
COMMON GOOD: SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE: POLICY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE PANEL 60 (1989) [hereinafter FORD FOUNDATION].
49. GAO, supra note 45, at 3. Most of the funds used to pay UI benefits come from
state payroll taxes levied on employers. Four states also levy taxes on employees. ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: BENEFITS, FINANCING, AND COVERAGE: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS 49 (1995) [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT]. Each state maintains a trust
fund with the United States Treasury used for depositing program income and paying UI
benefits. GAO, supra note 45, at 16. In addition, the UI program provides for automatic
federal loans so that the states can continue to pay UI benefits even if state trust funds are
depleted. Id. Until the 1970s, states rarely used the loan account. Id. But three recessions,
including back-to-back recessions in 1980 and 1981-82, depleted many state trust fund
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a series of recessions.-5 The states, which control eligibility for UT in
addition to collecting UI taxes, responded by ratcheting up their eligibility
criteria."1 Each state requires applicants for UI benefits to prove that
they have worked a minimum number of weeks and/or earned a minimum
total wage in some designated period. Failure to meet these eligibility
criteria results in a denial of benefits.52 By raising the minimum weeks
or wages needed to qualify for benefits, the states saved money But they
did so by pushing ever increasing numbers of low-wage, part-time, or
short duration workers - i.e., contingent workers - out of the UI safety
net.53
The GAO study also documented a number of techniques employers use
to subvert UI's experience rating. The term "experience rating" means that
an employer's UI tax rate increases when the number of layoffs attributable
to that employer goes up.' The goal of experience rating is to reduce
layoffs by giving employers a financial incentive to retain employees even
during low points in the business cycle.55 In fact, however, any tactic that
reserves. Id. at 16-17 As many as 21 state funds became insolvent. Id. at 17
50. GAO, supra note 45, at 16-17 Durmg.a recession, the funds experience the double
burden of decreased contributions and increased payouts. Id. at 16.
51. See id. at 3 (noting that declining trust fund balances were associated with law
changes that restricted program eligibility).
52. The criteria vary significantly from state to state. Massachusetts, for example,
requires an applicant to have earned at least $2,000 during the statutory "base period."
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, § 24(a) (West Supp. 1995). This period is usually the
four calendar quarters just prior to the application for benefits. Id. ch. 15 1A, § 1. However,
a different base can be used in some cases, if the use of the prior four quarters would result
in a denial. Id. In New York, an applicant must have worked during at least twenty of the
last fifty-two weeks or fifteen of the last fifty-two weeks plus forty of the last one hundred
and four weeks. N.Y LAB. LAw § 527 (McKinney 1988). In addition, the New York
applicant must have earned an average of at least $89.25 per week during the weeks she or
he worked. N.Y LAB. LAW § 590(5) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
53. See GAO, supra note 45, at 3 (noting that, while states improved financial condi-
tion of state trust funds, fewer unemployed workers received UI benefits). In fact, the UI
eligibility of workers who are available only for part-time work has long been contested
terrain. A 1994 survey conducted by the Interstate Conference of Employment Security
Agencies (ICESA) found that individuals seeking part-time work only are ineligible for
UI benefits in 39 of the 50 states. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 49, at 104.
54. See GAO, supra note 45, at 16 (stating that employer's tax rates will vary according
to its experience m laying off workers who subsequently receive UI benefits).
55. See ADvIsORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 49, at 73 (noting argument that
experience rating encourages stable employment). By retaining the employees, the employer
would avoid an increase in its UI tax rate. See id. (noting that highest tax rates are imposed
on employers that generate most cost to system).
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decreases the number of UI claims attributable to a given employer will
serve to reduce the employer's rate.
One tactic noted in the GAO report is the manipulation of employees'
hours and wages to prevent them from reaching the minimums needed for
UI eligibility 56 Another approach involves classifying employees as
independent contractors whenever possible because independent contractors
are not covered by ULI Employee leasing may also circumvent UI
regulations because the company leasing a worker is sometimes not
considered the worker's employer.58 If the lessor company is not deemed the
employer, it can cut workers at will without experiencing a layoff chargeable
to its TI account.5 9
In short, contingent workers are increasingly squeezed out of the T
system, both by ever narrower state eligibility standards and by employers
who manipulate their work forces and increase their use of contingent work-
ers in an explicit effort to minimize their contributions to the UI funds.'
I. The Tradition of Provision: Relational Employment
Documenting the impact of contingent work on the widening gaps in the
work-based social welfare system is surely a worthwhile endeavor. No
rational reform can proceed in the absence of data. But it is one thing to
begin to assemble the data and quite another to decide how to respond.
Solutions to the problems that contingent work poses are likely to be some
time m the making. At this juncture, it may be most wise simply to ask why
the phenomenon of contingent work has riveted the attention of analysts from
so many different disciplines. I believe one reason is this: Contingent work
is forcing a fundamental realignment of crucial social obligations. It poses
56. GAO, supra note 45, at 38. In New York, for example, a worker earning minimum
wage who works 20 hours per week or less will not earn the $89.25 average wage required
for eligibility (i.e., $4.25 x 20 = $85.00). See N.Y LAB. LAW § 590(5) (McKinney Supp.
1995) (containing New York's minimum earnings requirement).
57 GAO, supra note 45, at 39.
58. Id. at 40. This is a very complex area, implicating ERISA's nondiscrimination
rules as well as UI regulations. Legislation to address some of these practices is now pending
m several states. Id.
59 See rd. (listing employee leasing as contributing factor to declining numbers of UI
recipients).
60. Recent recommendations by the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
would offer contingent workers some relief. The Council recommends changes in UI
eligibility that would ease the burden on low-wage applicants and would prohibit the states
from barring claims by part-time workers. ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 49, at
17-19
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quite starkly the question: What do employers and employees owe one
another? The answers it offers are more than a bit troubling.
Employment is inherently a conundrum, for it is simultaneously a
transaction and a relation. It is a contract, and it is a way of life. Indeed,
one can view employment as a constantly shifting balance, with relation
dominating at some points and transaction at others. 61 But the break has
never been complete - until, perhaps, now The defining feature of
contingent employment may be that it renders work a nearly pure transac-
tion, stripped of any pretense of relation between employer and employee.
One might well ask, "Does that matter9 " My tentative answer is that
it matters a great deal because for centuries the employment relation has
been a crucial locus of social provision. We should not romanticize tis
fact. Employer provision has frequently been patronizing and, at times,
directly oppressive. 62 But in light of the enormous outcry against employer
mandates in the recent health care debates, it may be useful to remind
ourselves that employer-provided benefits, in one form or another, have a
very long history
It may also be useful to remember that the roots of employment law lie
in the ancient relation of master and servant, not m the johnny-come-lately
law of contract.63 Few contemporary Americans aspire to be servants, and
the negative side of that relation, with its constraints on liberty and its lack
of dignity, tends to dominate our thinking. But, again at the risk of romanti-
cizing, it seems important to note that by law or custom, masters owed many
obligations to their servants.' An indentured servant or apprentice was
61. For two recent works that explore the relational and transactional aspects of
employment, one on the macroscopic, the other on the microscopic level, see KAREN ORREN,
BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAw, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES (1991) and Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REv 8 (1993). Of course, the classic work on the
relational aspect of contracts remains IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN
INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980).
62. Infra text accompanying notes 85-90.
63. One would be bold indeed to venture to pinpoint the birth of contract law, but the
writ of assumpsit from which modem contract law springs did not emerge in full bloom until
the decision in Slade's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1602). Unless Henry Maine was sorely
mistaken, the status of master and servant long predated contract law. For a detailed study
of the persistence of master and servant rules well into the nineteenth century, see ORREN,
supra note 61, at 79-91.
64. Karen Orren disputes this interpretation, at least as to legal obligations. She states
that "whatever household imagery may have been present in the sources, any inference that
employers, earlier or later, had a legal responsibility for the welfare of their employees
should be approached with extreme caution." ORREN, supra note 61, at 100. Orren does not
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 889 (1995)
housed in the master's home, clothed, fed, cared for if he became ill, and
trained in the techniques of the master's craft.65 In short, the employment
relation was the source of the apprentice's housing, maintenance, medical
care, and education. Apprentices, of course, were in some sense a pnvi-
leged class. House servants, a lower caste, were not educated or trained.
They were subject to corporal punishment by their masters, and they were
bound to them for a fixed term, during which time they were not free to
leave.' Their compensation was maintenance and a cash wage.67 But there
is evidence that even as to the house servant, the master's obligation went
further and included maintenance and care during illness. In The Invention
of Free Labor, Robert Steinfeld quotes an eighteenth-century treatise that
states that "if a servant retained for a year, happen witun the time of his
service to fall sick, or to be hurt or disabled by the act of God, or in doing
his master's business," the master could not discharge him and, indeed,
must continue the servant's wage.
68
The master-servant relationship that Stemfeld describes has many
striking parallels to the employment relationship as it developed in early in-
dustry The story of the Lowell mills provides ready examples. Although
the mill operatives did not live in their masters' homes,69 the corporations
deny that employers provided their servants with room and board, but she urges that this must
not be "regarded as solicitude." Id. However, she does dispute the assertion that the law ob-
liged employers to provide medical care. Id. at 101. Because my concern is with a tradition
of provision rather than its legal basis, I believe my argument stands, despite Orren's caution.
65. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 25 (1991).
66. In this, they joined the apprentice, who was typically bound to his master for a term
as long as seven years. Id. at 25. The house servant more commonly served on a yearly
basis. Id. at 31. Orren notes that in England the assumption of a fixed term shifted to the
"at will" concept in the 1880s. ORREN, supra note 61, at 80-81.
67 STEINFELD, supra note 65, at 31. The apprentice was not paid a wage. His training
was his compensation. Id. at 25.
68. Id. at 31 (quoting RICHARD BURN, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER
(15th ed. 1785)). Again, Orren's view is more negative. She notes that while American
judges would pay the sick servant wages already earned, the English courts frequently held
that the servant's failure to complete his contract barred all wage claims, including those for
services rendered before his illness or injury ORREN, supra note 61, at 97 Even the
American courts might allow the employer to deduct from the servant's wages any damages
that the employer suffered because of the servant's inability to work. Id. at 98.
69 This would have posed some substantial difficulty because the population of Lowell
grew from 2,000 in 1823 to 17,000 in 1836. HARRIET HANSON ROBINSON, LOOM AND
SPINDLE OR LIFE AMONG THE EARLY MILL GIRLS 11 (Press Pacifica 1976). Robinson's book
is a contemporary account by a woman employed in the mills from 1835 to 1848. Id. at ix.
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built boarding houses to lodge them.
These were leased to respectable widows - often well-bred and
somewhat cultivated - who in return for low rental terms agreed to keep
the property clean and see to it that the girls obeyed the company's
rules. Each boardinghouse keeper, by the terms of her lease, was
required to set aside one bedroom as an infirmary 70
The corporations prescribed the diet to be served in the boarding houses,7
all of which were equipped with running water and supplied with soap.72
Like the servant or apprentice, then, the Lowell mill operative looked to
her employer for food, shelter, and medical care. Like the servant or
apprentice, she was also required to sign on for a fixed term, usually twelve
months, and to give two weeks' notice of her intent to leave. 73 A too early
departure could result in a "dishonorable discharge," which could place the
offender's name on a blacklist freely shared among the mills.74 By con-
trast, a worker fulfilling her contract and giving the proper notice would be
given an honorable discharge.75
Lowell was, of course, merely an early entry in a controversial chapter
in American employment history - the era of welfare capitalism. Smart
Brandes, whose book is a richly detailed portrait of this phenomenon,
It was first published m 1898. Id. at vii. There were 5,000 mill operatives m Lowell by
1833. HANNAH JOSEPHSON, THE GOLDEN THREADS: NEW ENGLAND'S MILL GIRLS AND
MAGNATES 56 (1949).
70. JOSEPHSON, supra note 69, at 68, 70.
71. See id. at 68 (noting diet of those living m boarding houses).
72. Although the mill owners owned the boarding houses and had constructed them
expressly for the mill operatives, they were not provided without charge. ROBINSON, supra
note 69, at 46; JOSEPHSON, supra note 69, at 213.
73. JOSEPHSON, supra note 69, at 72.
74. Id. at 222. Steinfeld writes that, despite these contracts, workers actually left
employment freely, and employers maae little or no effort to stop them. STEINFELD, supra
note 65, at 162-63. This seems to have been the case substantially prior to the conversion to
at-will hiring that Orren describes. See ORREN, supra note 61, at 80-81. Apparently,
blacklisting was usually reserved for more serious offenses, such as "disobedience to orders"
or "dissatisfaction with wages." See JOSEPHSON, supra note 69, at 222 (listing reasons for
inclusion on black list).
75. See ROBINSON, supra note 69, at 45 (acknowledging author's receipt of honorable
discharge). This practice too had strong parallels in earlier times. Orren notes that a
testimonial letter from the prior employer specifying the circumstances of the employee's
previous employment was necessary to obtain wage work in the Middle Ages. Hiring an
employee without such a letter subjected the employer to legal penalties. ORREN, supra note
61, at 104.
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defines welfare capitalism as "any service provided for the comfort or
improvement of employees which was neither a necessity of the industry
nor required by law ,,76 In the century following the opemng of the Lowell
mills, there was much that met this definition. Companies built worker
housing: "[B]y 1916 at least a thousand American firms provided housing
for at least 600,000 employees and their families, roughly three percent of
the population of the United States."77 In the copper fields of Michigan,
Cornish miners established a system that later spread throughout much of
American mming: "Each month the mining companies deducted a fixed
sum, in return for which a company physician treated the miner and his
family ," Employer-provided health care spread, perhaps reaching its apex
with the Endicott Johnson Company of Binghamton, New York, whose
Workers Medical Service "include[d] eighteen physicians, four dentists,
five dental hygienists, two physical therapists, four bacteriologists, four
pharmacists, seventeen technicians, sixty-seven nurses, and sixteen clerks
and office assistants."7 9  Employers ran nurseries, kindergartens, and
schools.' They built recreational facilities, the Endicott Johnson Company
boasting "softball and hardball diamonds, skating nnks, tennis courts,
bowling alleys, swimming pools, parks, picnic grounds, dance pavilions,
a horse racetrack, and an eighteen-hole golf course."I1 In 1911, employers
introduced group life insurance," It was followed eleven years later by
group sickness and accident insurance.13 Between 1900 and 1925, employ-
ers initiated some 300 pension plans.84
Welfare capitalism has been vehemently criticized. Company housing
was often, though not uniformly, shoddy in both construction and upkeep. 5
Many residents of company towns received no cash wage. They were paid
in scrip redeemable only at the overpriced company store.8 6 Some com-
76. STUART D. BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM: 1880-1940 5-6 (1976).
77 Id. at 38.
78. Id. at 93.
79 GERALD ZAHAVI, WORKERS, MANAGERS, AND WELFARE CAPITALISM: THE
SHOEWORKERS AND TANNERS OF ENDICOTT JOHNSON, 1890-1950 48 (1988).
80. See BRANDES, supra note 76, at 52-65 (describing company-provided education).
81. ZAHAvi, supra note 79, at 50-5 1.
82. BRANDES, supra note 76, at 97
83. Id.
84. See id. at 106 (noting estimates of employer-established pension programs).
85. Id. at 40-42.
86. Id. at 47
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pany towns were "closed," i.e., private police barred entrance to all but
residents in an effort to exclude the dreaded union organizers.87 The
schools served mostly to indoctrinate the young with a work ethic,"8 and the
pensions could be withdrawn unilaterally by the company 89 Only the
medical benefits seem to withstand the critics' scrutipy, though the consen-
sus of historians is that these too were often quite meager.9°
This dark underside of welfare capitalism is undemable. It was pater-
nalistic to the point of insult, virulently (and sometimes violently) anti-
union, and frequently miserly in the extreme. But these enormous faults
should not obscure a simple point: Welfare capitalism extended and
expanded the tradition of social provision by masters/employers for their
servants/employees from pre-industnal times to the dawn of the New Deal.
Through welfare capitalism, employers voluntarily assumed a key role in
social provision. As George Zahavi notes in describing the Endicott John-
son Shoe Company, "[t]he company attempted to unite the functions
of firm and family The corporation became a partner in providing basic
family needs such as medical care, relief, recreation, and housing."9
For Stuart Brandes, the New Deal marks the end point of welfare
capitalism. The system was already creaking by 1930, and the Depression
both curtailed employer efforts and spurred unprecedented government
action. The Social Security Act of 1935' instituted a federal pension
program and pushed the states to create unemployment insurance systems.
The labor law reforms of the 1930s also freed umons to take an active role
in the work of social provision.93
In the end, however, neither government nor umon supplanted em-
ployer provision; indeed, in crucial ways both reinforced it. An important
example can be found in the actions of the National War Labor Board
(NWLB). During World War II, the NWLB froze the wages of American
87 See id. at 49 (noting company housing lease provisions limiting ingress and egress
to occupant and family).
88. Id. at 52.
89. See id. at 107 (noting common provision containing right of company to revoke
pension at company's pleasure).
90. See id. at 97 (outlining drawbacks of mutual benefit associations). The Endicott
Johnson facility may have had the most extensive medical benefits. Zahavi writes that, m
1928, 94% of eligible individuals or their family members used the medical services.
ZAHAvi, supra note 79, at 48.
91. ZAHAVI, supra note 79, at 46.
92. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
93. BRAND-s, supra note 76, at 142-45.
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workers. 94 Faced with a severe labor shortage, employers pressured the
Board for relief. The response was a 1943 ruling that "fringe adjustments"
in the form of employer contributions to insurance and pension plans would
not be deemed wages." Historian Beth Stevens notes that "[tius move
opened the floodgates to the institution of employee benefits programs as
unions and management sought wage increases under the guise of 'fringe
adjustments."'9 6
Earlier, in the Depression years, unions had supported public benefit
initiatives such as the Social Security Act. But in the boom times that fol-
lowed the War, public provision was not on the legislative agenda. Ameri-
cans consistently demonstrate a deep-seated preference for decentralized,
private-sector mechanisms and are suspicious of any program run by the
federal government and funded with tax dollars.97 Responding to this
preference, unions actively and successfully bargained for ever-increasing
packages of employer-provided, private sector benefits.98 Rather than pro-
viding benefits directly, government reinforced the private, employment-
based system by granting fringe benefits preferential tax treatment. 99
In short, employer provision has been a cornerstone of economic well-
being in the United States from pre-industnal times to the present day In
fact, as the health care debates demonstrated, Americans are more depen-
dent on employer provision than citizens of any other country Other
industrialized countries provide universal health care; we insure only 82%
of our nonelderly population, 61 % through employer-provided insurance.'0'
Other countries operate two-tier pension systems that tie minimum pro-
94. See Beth Stevens, Blurring the Boundaries: How the Federal Government Has
Influenced Welfare Benefits in the Private Sector, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 123, 132-33 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988).
95. Id. at 133.
96. Id. There was also the small matter of the 80% excess profits tax imposed by the
Revenue Act of 1942 as part of the effort to finance the War. The Act gave employers a
strong incentive to lower their pretax profits by providing benefits to employees. Id. at 130.
97 This preference for decentralized, private-sector mechanisms is not an artifact of
either the Reagan years or the 1994 elections. It has deep roots in American political tradi-
tion. On this point, see Roy Lubove's classic work, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY:
1900-1935 1-24 (1968) (describing constraint of ideology of voluntarism on social security
legislation).
98. STEVENS, supra note 94, at 133-35.
99. For a discussion of the preferential tax treatment accorded fringe benefits and its
effect on American workers, see Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinlang the Link
Between Wages and Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REv 1421, 1505-09 (1993).
100. EBRI REPORT 1995, supra note 11, at 7 tbl. 2.
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vision for the elderly directly to citizenship.O' Our system links all benefits
to employment records and lifetime wage earning. 1 2 Ours is what the Ford
Foundation labelled "the peculiarly American system of employment-
related social welfare protection."1
0 3
Ilf. Transactional Work in a Relational World:
The Challenge of Contingent Employment
In the preceding sections of this paper, I have tried to demonstrate
that all of us - government, society, and workers - have long relied on
employers to provide more than a wage. Indeed, we have used the employ-
ment relation to insure against the inherent frailty of the human condition.
In the great economic boom that stretched from the end of World War II
into the 1970s," °4 employers were the primary source of health insurance,
life insurance, disability coverage, and pension benefits.0 5 Employers
covered both workers and workers' children- from the cradle of the latter
to the grave of the former, so long as the worker's tenure in employment
endured and, if the worker achieved retiree status, perhaps beyond.
106
Thus, I agree with Dr. Belous that our present social welfare system rests
on the assumption "of a household with one worker who works for one
employer during his economic lifetime."0 7
In moving to contingent hiring, employers are unilaterally abandomng
this fundamental social contract. The dilemma for the larger society is
101. See EDwARD BERKOWITZ & KIM McQUAiD, CREATING THE WELFARE STATE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY REFORM 103 (1980) (noting concept of plan
paying benefits to everyone).
102. O'Connell, supra note 99, at 1434, 1490-96; see also BERKOWrrz & MCQUAID,
supra note 101, at 103 (noting that only those with employment records receive benefits).
103. FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 48, at 51, see also Martin Rein & Lee Rainwater,
The Institutions of Social Protection, in PUBLICIPRIVATE INTERPLAY IN SOCIAL PROTECTION:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 25, 50-54 (Martin Rein & Lee Rainwater eds., 1986) (describing
distribution of social benefits in United States).
104. For a masterful and provocative commentary on this lengthy economic aberration,
see Michael Elliott, America: A Better Yesterday, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 3-26.
105. Social Security, to which both employer and employee contribute, also provides
disability coverage and pension benefits.
106. That the employer of the cradle will rarely be the employer of the grave seems not
to matter, so long as both needy ends of the spectrum are covered by social welfare
protections rooted in employment. If both parent and offspring have "good" jobs, this should
be the result.
107 Belous, supra note 1, at 876 (emphasis in original).
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whether, and how, to respond. And while the answer is far from clear, the
options are actually quite limited. There may be many variations, but I see
only four basic approaches to the issue of benefits for contingent workers:
1. We can allow employers to opt out of providing benefits, and we
can provide for contingent workers through enhanced social insur-
ance.
2. We can require employers to cover their contingent workers by
mandating benefits.
3. We can try to encourage the creation of new private benefit net-
works, larger than a single employer.
4. We can do nothing, leaving the problem to the individual worker
and her family
It would be impossible in this already lengthy comment to sketch out
each option, even if I knew how each would play out - which I don't. But
I offer a preliminary exploration in the hope that it may provoke comment
and criticism.
A. Augmented Social Insurance
At a minimum, augmenting social insurance to cover contingent work-
ers would mean providing the uninsured with health coverage and expand-
ing and patching Social Security's OASDI (Old Age, Survivors' and Dis-
ability Insurance)' and UI (Unemployment Insurance) 109 programs. The
latter clearly needs fixing, as Congress recognized in creating the Advisory
Council on Unemployment Compensation and charging it with root and
branch reform."° If UI continues to exclude more than 60% of workers
who lose their jobs,"' current efforts to reform Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) by "putting recipients to work" are doomed
to fail. Regardless of one's political viewpoint, it is difficult to imagine
that the one-third of current AFDC recipients who are adults"' will become
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
110. The Council was created by the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-164, 105 Stat. 1049 (1991).
111. See supra text accompanying note 47
112. The 1994 Green Book lists 14.1 million AFDC recipients in 1993, of whom 9.5
million were children. This is 67 %, meaning that 33 % of recipients are adults. COMMITrEE
ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AN OvERvIEw OF ENTITLEMENT
PROGRAMS 395 tbl. 10-24 (1994).
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benefit-rich core workers upon entering the work force. Most of them will
enter as contingent workers whose low pay, limited hours, and frequent job
changes will disqualify them from UI coverage. When they lose their
jobs - and it is likely that many will"' - they will have no stopgap source
of income to pay their rent and feed their children. To date, this problem
has met with deafemng silence. It needs to be addressed. 1 4
As for expanding OASDI - or any other government program - even
a less than astute observer can see that the political tsunami is moving m
the other direction. In addition, were one to propose a new public pension
system and enhanced survivors' insurance and disability coverage for
contingent workers, the powerful private insurance lobby would surely take
up the cudgel. Still, that an approach seems infeasible at the moment is no
reason to reject it out of hand. Presumably, contingent workers are
attractive because they perform productive labor at low cost, a cost that
ignores the inherent vulnerability of human beings. It is neither wrong nor
stupid to consider whether those vulnerabilities should be shared in a public
system,"Is as, indeed, they already are to a limited extent by 0ASDI16 and
by public disability insurance systems in five states." 7
113. Women remain on jobs for a substantially shorter period of time than men. JOHN
A. TURNER ET AL., PENSION POLICY FOR A MOBILE LABOR FORCE 18 (1993). Roughly 90%
of adult AFDC recipients are women. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF AFDC RECIPIENTS, FY 1991 2
(1991).
114. The Institute for Women's Policy Research has conducted an excellent and highly
relevant study See Roberta Spalter-Roth, Heidi Hartmann & Beverly Burr, Income
Insecurity- The Failure of Unemployment Insurance to Reach Out to Working AFDC
Mothers, Paper Presented at the Second Annual Employment Task Force Conference (March
20-22, 1994) (unpublished paper, on file with author). This paper demonstrates that many
women cycle in and out of work, UI, and AFDC.
115. In fact, such a suggestion was recently made with respect to disability coverage.
Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort
Reforn: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 CoLUM. L. REv
75 (1993).
116. In an earlier work on this subject, I described some of the specific deficiencies m
the old age insurance (OA1) and disability insurance (DI) programs that affect workers with
discontinuous work records. See O'Connell, supra note 99, at 1461-68, 1490-96. To better
cover contingent workers, we need to abolish "recency" requirements, which exclude workers
who have breaks in service from disability coverage. We also need to abolish waiting periods
so that frequent job changers do not find themselves permanently "waiting." And we need
to stop penalizing those who spend fewer than 35 years in paid employment by greatly
reducing their Social Security retirement (OA1).
117 California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island have public disability
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Using social insurance to provide benefits to contingent workers would
also bring the United States into line with most other developed countries.
As Dr. Belous notes,
nations with more advanced social welfare systems than the United States
may be in a better position to obtain the benefits from part-time workers
strategies. Many nations that have high part-time employment levels have
developed advanced social safety nets that compensate for many of the
costs born by part-time workers."'
B. Employer Mandates
Employer mandates are an alternative to expanded social insurance.
Although the Chamber of Commerce and other business lobbies spent last
year comparing mandates to being boiled in oil, responsible policymakers
need to consider this option outside the political firestorm. The followers
of Chicken Little will point in horror to Europe and assure us that requiring
anything of employers will immediately send the unemployment rate into
the stratosphere. But employer mandates need not include six weeks' paid
vacation (Germany), two years' severance pay for every laid-off employee
(Belgium), or a Christmas bonus equal to a month's pay (Germany).
119
They would involve basic social provision - health insurance, pensions,
disability, and unemployment compensation.
Admittedly, employer mandates ran counter to current trends.
Mandates would return to employers costs they have been busily shifting
to their employees. For example, employers' medical costs fell last year
for the first time in a decade. 2 0 But Henry Aaron of the Brookings Institu-
tion argues that this may simply reflect "offloading costs onto employees
or curtailing their coverage."' 2' As I have noted above,' this offloading
insurance systems. Puerto Rico also operates a public short-term disability program. 'SoC.
SECURITY BULL., Spring 1992, at 124 n.12.
118. Belous, supra note 1, at 873.
119. For a discussion of these practices, see Charles Stein, The Politics of Security:
Amencaag Are Feeling Nervous About Their Futures, Can Clinton Quiet Their Fears? At What
Cost?, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov 21, 1993, at Al, Donald R. Utroska, Management in Europe:
More Than Just Etiquette, MGMT. REV., Nov 1992, at 21.
120. Milt Freudenheim, Health Costs Paid by Employers Drop for First Time in a
Decade, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995, at Al.
121. Id.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 27-42.
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is also occurring in the pension area. Each year, thousands of employers
terminate defined-benefit plans, while only about two-thirds of them offer
their employees an alternative.' In addition, half of these alternate plans
are markedly less generous than the plan they replace. 24 A-survey by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce found that contributions to defined-benefit
plans average 4.9% of payroll. 25 By contrast, employer contributions to
"savings plans" like 401(k) average only 2.3% of payroll.'26 Employees
are supposed to make up the difference or do without.
The second way that employer mandates swim against the tide is by
"requir[ing] a group of 'haves' to extend benefits to a group of 'have
nots. '" Because employers would, presumably, spread the cost of
mandated coverage across their employees, those who currently have
benefits might get less so that those without could get more. This is
dangerous territory, as was amply demonstrated by the furor aroused by the
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage plan. The plan required wealthy elders
to contribute to catastrophic health coverage for poorer beneficiaries as well
as themselves. Their powerful lobby beat Congress into submission, and
the Act was repealed. 28 Still, if the territory is dangerous, it is nonetheless
familiar. Employers have always been key actors in American systems of
social provision. That they wish to opt out now is relevant but not
determinative, for there are dangers to the alternate turf as well.
C. Multi-Employer Approaches
At the close of his paper, Dr. Belous suggests in a general way what
some of tus alternate turf might look like. Using a term much in vogue in
employment discussions in the 1990s, he urges "flexibility "'? His main
theme, if I read this section correctly, is that linking benefit acquisition to
123. See ACTUARIES, supra note 28, at 14 (noting that two-thirds of employers who
terminated plans did not leave workers without coverage).
124. Id. at 16.
125. Willette, supra note 32, at 2A.
126. Id. at 2A.
127 Charles Stein, Who's Going to Pay the Bill Top Issue in Health Reform, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 21, 1994, at 35, 37
128. See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat.
683 (1988); Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103
Stat. 1979 (1989); see also Elaine S. Povich, Senate OKs End of Catastrophic Insurance
Surtax, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 1989, at 1, 1.
129. Belous, supra note 1, at 876-78.
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a single employer defies reality because contingent workers have many
employers during their work lives.
30
Clearly, changing employers wreaks havoc with pension acquisition,1
3'
and full pension portability, which Dr. Belous suggests, is an idea I readily
endorse. But full portability will help only the employee who moves from
a job with a pension to a job with a pension. An excellent recent study by
John Turner of the Department of Labor suggests that, particularly for
women, such moves are rare. Only 38% of workers in female-dominated
industries have pension coverage; 32 thus, a woman moving from one
female-dominated industry to another is likely to lack pension coverage on
one end or the other, if not both. Portability won't help such an employee
because it fails to grapple with the problem of the employer who opts out
of pension coverage in the first place. Nor will portability help the
employee who cannot afford the contribution necessary to participate in a
401(k) plan.1 33 And would Dr. Belous's plan mean that employer, as well
as employee, contributions would vest immediately, or would five-year
vesting remain the rule? Immediate vesting would raise employer costs
substantially
I am leery of solutions grounded in "flexibility" because I think the
problem goes beyond regulations and paperwork. The truth is that many
employers fail to provide contingent workers with benefits because they
believe - correctly - that they can get away with it.' 34 While flexibility
might persuade some employers to provide a benefit that they now ignore
and may help some job-changers with pension continuity, I seriously doubt
that flexibility alone will provide very many contingent workers the
economic security they lack.
130. 1d. at 876.
131. In some of my earlier work, I spell out the losses that a job changer with a defined-
benefit pension plan suffers even if she is always a participant in her employer's plan and has
no gaps in her employment. See O'Connell, supra note 99, at 1458 n.171.
132. TURNERETAL.,supranote 113, at27
133. Traditional defined-benefit plans were noncontributory. That is, no employee
contribution was required for participation. By contrast, when an employer offers a § 401(k)
or other defined-contribution.plan, the employee generally must contribute a portion of her
salary to the plan in order to participate. Low-wage employees often cannot afford the
required contribution, and they are excluded from the plan. See Future Pension Income,
supra note 42, at 2314.
134. For a pilot study that showed a stunning lack of enthusiasm among small employers
for help with health insurance coverage, see Kenneth E. Thorpe et al., Reducing the Number
of Uninsured by Subsidizing Employment-Based Health Insurance: Results from a Pilot Study,
267 JAMA 945 (1992).
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Of course, there have been alternatives to employer provision. Umons
have provided pensions that follow their workers through frequent job
shifts. Immigrants to the Umted States developed mutual aid societies m
stunning numbers: forty-nine Czech mutual aid societies in Chicago
between 1870 and 1890 and thirty-five Italian "societa di muto soccorse"
in Cleveland alone. The societies provided their members with funds to
cover the expenses of illness, accidents, and funerals. They lent money for
home purchases and other expenditures. 35 But with only 16% of the labor
force umonized' and most of the lrmgrant societies extinct, the prospects
for private, nonemployer entities providing benefits to the millions who
now lack them seems remote. Certainly, creative thinking in this area
would not be amiss, but I am pessimistic about realizing many gains in the
short term.
D The Worker on His Own
This leaves, of course, the worker himself. If neither government nor
the employer will underwrite the contingent worker's social welfare, he
may simply have to go it alone. To many, this solution will seem correct.
Described in political terms, the argument would be that American work-
ers - like their European counterparts 37 - have been coddled. Society
will be better off if they regain a greater measure of self-reliance by giving
up the expensive benefits packages that are crushing American industry 138
There is no question that the cost of fringe benefits has skyrocketed.
Between 1950 and 1983, their value as a percentage of payroll increased
135. Robert F Harney, Introduction to Records of the Mutual Benefit Society: A Source
of Ethnocultural Studies, in 5 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION & ETHNICITY 33, 33 (George E.
Pozzetta ed., 1991).
136. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1994 439 tbl. 683 (114th ed. 1994) [hereinafter CENSUS 1994]. If the count is limited to
private, nonagricultural workers, the percentage falls to 11%. Id.
137 See sources cited supra note 119 (describing benefits provided to European
workers).
138. Whether American industry is being crushed is, of course, highly debatable. A
recently released international study rated the U.S. economy the world's most competitive
for a record second consecutive year. See Tyler Marshall, U.S. Widens Its Competitiveness
Lead, Study Says, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at D1, see also Guy de Jonqui~res, US Ranked
as 'Most Competitive' Nation, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at 15. For many companies, the
'90s has been a decade of record profits. See Steven Pearlstein, A Very Little Something
Extra: Inflation, Corporate Profits to Overshadow 1995's Modest Pay Raises, WASH. POST,
Aug. 26, 1994, at B1 (reporting 20% increase in corporate profits for 1993 and projected
10% increase in 1994).
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300% 139 In the ensuing decade, they grew an additional 75%, totalling
28.7% of overall compensation in 1993 14 But, as I have demonstrated
above, these are not wholly new costs. The post-New Deal fringe benefit is
the successor to pre-New Deal welfare capitalism. The costs may indeed be
spiralling, but the concept is far from new In addition, today's workers
face at least three perils that their pre-New Deal predecessors were largely
spared: divorce, out-of-control medical costs, and longevity
The first peril, divorce, undermines contingent workers' security
because many of them depend upon a spouse for their health insurance, pen-
sion coverage, and other benefits. 141 In 1939, the year spousal benefits were
added to the Social Security Act, 142 1.9 of every 1000 Americans obtained
a divorce. 43 In the peak year, 1981, the rate was 5.3 per 1000.'" Although
rates have since fallen,"45 Americans still have the highest divorce rate on
earth. 14 Thus, although marriage can provide a contingent worker with
valuable benefits, today's marriages, like today's jobs, are often not around
139 Killard W Adamache & Frank A. Sloan, Fnnge Benefits: To Tax or Not to Tax?,
38 NAT'L TAX J. 47, 47 (1985).
140. CENSUS 1994, supra note 136, at 433 tbl. 671. I derive the percentage increase by
comparing the United States Department of Commerce figure for the percentage of total
employee compensation represented by fringe benefits in 1983 - 16.4% - with the 1993
Bureau of the Census figure. For the earlier figure, see BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REVISED ESTIMATES OF THE NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT
ACCOUNTS, SURV CURRENT Bus., July 1984, at 72 tbl. 6.5B, 94 tbl. 8.4.
141. Dr. Belous presents data showing that 17 % of individuals who work part time for
economic reasons and 34% of individuals who work part time for noneconomic reasons obtain
health coverage through someone else's employer. Belous, supra note 1, at 875tbi. 6.
Presumably, in most cases this someone else is a spouse.
142. Social Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 202, 53 Stat. 1360,
1363-1367 (1939) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
143. 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 64 tbl. 216-20 (Bicentennial ed. 1975) [hereinafter HISTORICAL
STATISTICS].
144. CENSUS 1994, supra note 136, at 102 tbl. 139
145. The figure for 1993 was 4.6 divorces per 1000 Americans. NATIONAL CENTER FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, ADVANCE REPORT OF FINAL DIVORCE STATISTICS, 1989 AND 1990 1
(1995).
146. The sole exception is the Maldive Islands. At 11.56 divorces per 1000 (in 1991),
they leave the United States in the dust. The next closest competitor is Lithuania, with a rate
of 4.07 divorces per 1000. The United Kingdom, a country often compared with the United
States, had a rate of 2.88 in 1990, when the United States' rate was 4.7 See DEPARTMENT
OF INT'L ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK: 1992
318-21 tbl. 14 (1994).
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for the long haul. It is far more important in 1995 than it was in 1935 for
an individual to have direct, not derivative, access to benefits.' 47
Although high divorce rates make derivative benefits a nskier
proposition now than when they were created in the 1930s and 1940s,' 48 they
are certainly better than nothing. Yet nothing is exactly what many
contingent workers have. Dr. Belous cites statistics that dispel the myth that
all contingent workers are the spouses of benefit-rich core workers. He
quotes Levitan and Conway's study showing that approximately 30% of part-
time workers have no health coverage at all. 49
This lack of health coverage is the second key difference between our
self-reliant pre-New Deal worker and the worker of today Each year, I am
forcefully reminded of the dramatic escalation in health care costs by a case
I cover with my contracts students. The case concerns an elderly woman
who spent eleven months in a hospital in 1955-56, at a total cost of
$3,218.30.150 This figure is put into context by the fact that the patient's
very modest house (which is the subject of the contract dispute) was worth
$7,000."' In short, in the mid-1950s, one could spend two years in the
hospital for the price of a modest home. I doubt that one could spend two
months in a hospital for a comparable cost today That health care is simply
out of reach for the uninsured is a proposition so well proven in last year's
health care debate that I simply make the point and move on.
The last great difference between today's contingent worker and his
self-reliant pre-New Deal counterpart is the blessing and curse of longevity
147 Of course, there are some important ameliorating statutes. Divorced spouses may
collect some Social Security benefits on their ex-spouse's record. They can remain in the ex-
spouse's employer-provided health plan for up to three years after divorce, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1162(2)(A)(iv) (1988), 29 U.S.C. § 1163(3) (1988), if they are able to pay the premiums,
which can be as much as 102% of the spouse's premium. See 29 U.S.C. § 1162(3)(A)
(1988). I discuss the shortcomings of these and other ameliorative provisions in On the
Fringe. O'Connell, supra note 99, at 1478-97
148. I should note that the mid- and late-1940s also saw extremely high rates of divorce.
The 1946 rate was three times the 1933 rate. In fact, it was not surpassed until 1973. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND
CHILD SUPPORT 7 tbl. 1 (1979). Postwar peaks in the divorce rate have been noted since the
1860s. See Andrew Cherlin, The Trends: Marriage, Divorce, Remamage, m FAMILY IN
TRANSITION 128, 132, 133 fig. 3 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 4th ed.
1983).
149. Belous, supra note 1, at 875 tbl. 6; see also supra text accompanying notes 41-42
(discussing part-timers' lack of pension coverage); supra text accompanying note 53 (dealing
with part-timers' disqualification from UI benefits).
150. In re Estate of Crisan, 107 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Mich. 1961).
151. Id.
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 889 (1995)
The life expectancy of an American born m 1935, the year the Social
Security Act was passed, was 61.7 years. 52 In short, one had to defy the
odds to retire. 153 By contrast, an American child born in 1995 has a life
expectancy of more than seventy-six years.'" 4 Thus, today's contingent
worker needs to plan for eleven years of post-work life, a far cry from the
world that faced his self-reliant ancestor.' 55
Free market defenders may nonetheless assert that while this state of
affairs is not pretty, workers without benefits simply lack th skills necessary
to earn both benefits and their wage. Providing these workers with benefits
would amount to a subsidy beyond the value of their work. Ironically, the
public at large does subsidize fringe benefits, but not for those who currently
lack them. Instead, the tax code, by exempting most fringe benefits from
taxation, provides a subsidy for those workers who do receive benefits, with
the largest subsidies accruing to the highest paid employees.' 56
152. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 143, at 55 tbl. 107-15. For men (and most
retirees would be men) life expectancy was only 59.9 years. Id.
153. See Martin Woollacott, A Grey Burden That Makes the Men in Suits Shudder,
GUARDIAN, Jan. 11, 1995, at 20, 20 (noting that life expectancy was three years below
retirement age when Social Security was introduced).
154. CENSUS 1994, supra note 136, at 87 tbl. 114.
155. This assumes, of course, retirement at age sixty-five, but many workers retire
earlier. Writing in 1986, Michael Boskin noted that "[m]ore people now claim their first
Social Security check at age 62 than at age 65." MICHAEL J. BOSKIN, Too MANY PROMISES:
THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 49 (1986). A recent New York Times article
quoted an average retirement age of 63. Phillip Lutz, Workers Expected to Stay Longer and
Delay Retirement, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at 13LI 1.
156. The most highly compensated employees get the largest subsidies because of gradu-
ated tax rates. That is, excluding an item from taxation is more valuable to a person who
would otherwise pay 30 cents on the dollar in taxes than it is for someone who would other-
wise pay only 15 cents. In On the Frnge, I deal with the issue of tax subsidies at some length
and provide a number of examples of their effect. O'Connell, supra note 99, at 1504-09.
I am aware that Professor Handelman disagrees with my classification of this treatment
as a subsidy, at least with regard to health insurance. Gwen Thayer Handelman, On Our
Own: Strategies for Securing Health and Retirement Benefits in Contingent Employment, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV 815, 839 n.151 (1995); Gwen Thayer Handelman, The Truth About
Tax Subsidies for Health Benefits, 61 TAX NOTES 353, 353 n.2 (1993) [hereinafter The Truth
About Tax Subsidies]. She also correctly notes that the language of a sentence on page 1423
of my article is inconsistent with a position I take on pages 1504-09. Handelman, The Truth
About Tax Subsidies, supra, at 353 n.2, 356 n.18 and accompanying text. I accept Professor
Handelman's criticism. I should not have used the word "wealth" on page 1423, and, had
I been thinking with my tax hat on, I would not have done so. The error to which I plead
guilty, however, is using the term "wealth" too loosely on page 1423. Were I to rewrite the
offending sentence, I would say, "Although these devices [fringe benefits] provide access to
money or services, they are intended not to augment cash income, but to insulate the recipient
ECONOMIC INSECURITY
As for contingents, however, apparently the market has spoken. It
proposes to expel one-quarter to one-third of American workers from the
social welfare system. Covering them is "too expensive" for the employer,
so the cost of their welfare - a cost that has been shared through the
workplace for decades, if not for centuries - is to be lifted from the
employer and placed squarely on the contingent employee's shoulders. In
the hard, cold world where work is a transaction and not a relation, many
contingent workers are simply on their own.
In the end, however, decisions about social welfare are as political as
they are economic. The market may have spoken, but it does not get the last
word. The economic decision merely poses the hard social and political
questions. What happens to contingent workers is not up to employers or
the marketplace. It is up to us all.
from economic calamity." The benefits I describe do indeed augment wealth.

